421 Yifu Building, No.10 Huixin Dongjie, Chaoyang District, Beijing, China, 100029

guoxuan@uibe.edu.cn

POSITION

Research Institute for Global Value Chains University of International Business and Economics(UIBE), China 2022.09 -

Assistant Professor in Economics

EDUCATION

Pennsylvania State University, U.S.A. 2016.09 - Present

Thesis: Young Firms’ Financing Choices, Investment, and Growth Committee: Mark Roberts (Chair), David Argente, Karl Schurter Ph.D. in Economics 2022

Hanqing Institute, Renmin University, China 2013.09 - 2016.07

M.A. in Economics

Nanjing University, China 2009.09 - 2013.07

B.A. in Financial Engineering

RESEARCH FIELDS

Structure IO, Empirical Macroeconomics, Auctions, Firm Dynamics

PUBLICATION

‘Conventional’ Monetary Policy in OLG Models: Revisiting the Asset-substitution Channel

International Economic Review 2023(8)

Guanliang Hu, Guoxuan Ma, Wei Qiao, and Neil Wallace

Can Catastrophic Long-Term Care Insurance Policies Increase Private Insurance Coverage and Reduce Medicaid Expenditure?

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 2017(1)

Guoxuan Ma and Wei Sun

The Influence Factors of RMB Equilibrium Exchange Rate Fluctuation Analysis.

Economic Science (Chinese) 2013(5)

Guoxuan Ma and Run Yu

WORKING PAPER

Young Firms’ Financing Choices, Investment, and Growth

abstract This paper investigates the impact of access to different financing sources on young frms’ future growth trajectories. Studying this causal effect involves selection issues and the reduced form analysis is hard to deal with the firm’s dynamics behavior problem. To address these issues, I use the Kauffman Firm Survey data to construct a firm life-cycle model with financing constraints. In this model, different types of firms can simultaneously choose up to three debt financing sources: business bank loans, personal bank loans, and credit card borrowing. By altering the accessibility of different funding sources through the structural model, I fnd credit card borrowing is essential for young frms’ early period fnancing support. Without credit card borrowing, most firms get out of debt within 4 years and average assets accumulation can drop by 15%. I also investigate how firms react to a general increase in the financing cost caused by the consolidation trend of the local bank industry. Higher concentration increases costs on all funding sources, but by different levels. Besides the reduction of firm borrowing, higher concentration has a negative impact on firms’ long-run growth potential. But the impact is not monotone.

Information Asymmetry and Bidders’ Behavior in Common Value English Auctions

abstract In common value English auction, the model incompleteness problem indicates that bidders have multiple equilibrium bidding strategies. Moreover, when a bidder has an information advantage and her/his identity is not mandatory revealed, the strategic interactions among bidders can have important impact on bidding outcomes. The multiple bidding strategies plus the interactions among different type of bidders challenge the current identification and estimation methods for empirical analysis. To overcomes the identification challenge, first I utilize the bidder’s bidding history to construct the lower and upper bound of the bidder's private information to address the multiple equilibrium problem. Second, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the informed bidder's identity revealing decisions provide tools to amend model prediction and match the data. The paper finds that first, the informed bidder voluntarily reveals the identity when the item is not so worthwhile. Second, the influence from the informed bidder is decreasing as the number of participants increases and the effect depends on the level of information frictions. Applying the data from Chinese Judicial Auction, the empirical results shows that the noisy component is nontrivial, which gives the informed bidder's opportunity to take advantage of strategic bidding. And both active and inactive bidding strategies of the informed bidder can shift the winning price distribution leftward by preventing information revelation.